The LOCKSS project has developed and deployed in a world-wide test a peer-to-peer digital preservation appliance for academic journals published on the Web. The first version was based on a Linux boot floppy. After three years of testing it was replaced by the second version, based on OpenBSD and booting from CD-ROM. We describe the application, experience with the first version, our redesign, and experience with the initial deployment of the OpenBSD based version.
INTRODUCTION
The LOCKSS 1 (Lots Of Copies Keep Stuff Safe) program has implemented a peer-to-peer network appliance for digital preservation, and deployed test versions in a multi-year test at more than 50 libraries worldwide. The appliance has to operate, exposed to the Internet, in environments lacking skilled system administrators without imposing large administrative costs to install, maintain or upgrade it. The first version [10] was based on the Linux Router Project's floppy-based distribution. After the first 3 years testing, the appliance was redesigned to use a modified version of the OpenBSD install CD. This version was first deployed in January 2003. We describe the application, the experience leading up to the redesign of the appliance, the design and implementation of the new version. and our experience with the deployment.
THE LOCKSS PROGRAM
Scientific communication has transitioned to the Web. In particular, much peer-reviewed science now appears only in e-journal form [5] . Academic journals are funded by university and other librarians paying institutional subscription rates. The librarians consider it part of their job to preserve access to the record of science for future generations. The transition to the Web has meant a transition from a purchase model, in which librarians buy and own a copy of the journal, to a rental model, in which librarians rent access to the publisher's copy. Year-by-year rental 1 LOCKSS is a trademark of Stanford University. provides no guarantee of future access, and librarians fear the worst.
The LOCKSS program is implementing the purchase model for the Web, providing tools librarians can use to take custody of, and preserve access to, web-published materials. They allow libraries to run persistent web caches that:
• collect material by crawling the e-journal Web sites, • distribute material by acting like a proxy cache to make it seem to a library's readers that web pages are still available at their original URL, even if they are no longer available there from the original publisher [12] .
• preserve material by cooperating with other caches in a peer-to-peer network to detect and repair damage. The cache is implemented in Java as a single daemon including a special-purpose web crawler, the Jetty [2] web server, and the peer communication protocol.
Library budgets, especially for preservation, are never adequate [1] . To succeed in preserving access for future generations, the LOCKSS system must be affordable for the long term. Cost reduction has, therefore, been a major focus of the program from its inception. The LOCKSS technology is packaged as a network appliance, using generic hardware and Open Source software to reduce hard costs as far as possible. Soft costs, especially support and system administration, can easily dominate the hard costs. We have designed the system as a network appliance to minimize these costs too. We believe our ideas and experience in this area could be helpful to others.
LESSONS
The first version of the LOCKSS appliance [10] was based on the Linux Router Project (LRP) platform [8] , a boot floppy containing a minimal but functional Linux system in a RAMdisk. For our application, it was capable of downloading and installing into a temporary file sys-tem the LOCKSS daemon and the software on which it depended (e.g. the JVM) that would not fit on the floppy, To begin running the appliance, the host institution downloaded and ran a Windows program that formatted, wrote and checked a generic version of the floppy. When a generic PC was booted from this floppy; it asked the operator for the necessary configuration information and personalized the floppy, partitioned and created file systems on the disk, then downloaded the necessary software, installed it, and finally invoked the JVM to run the daemon.
The system evolved over about 3 years of testing to run at over 50 libraries worldwide and was largely sucessful in requiring neither great skill nor much attention from its host institution. This taught us many valuable lessons:
The floppies, used only during boot, were remarkably reliable. We had very few media problems.
Operators did not always pay attention to instructions to write-lock their floppies.
Running the system only from write-locked media (and from software verified against hashes on write-locked media) has many practical advantages in our environment:
• In unskilled hands, installing and configuring a Unix system to be adequately secure is a daunting and error-prone task. Running an almost completely preconfigured system from write-locked media obviates almost all of the effort and risk.
• Restoring a compromised system is a daunting and error-prone task even in skilled hands. Rebooting is all that is needed to restore the LOCKSS appliance to a known state. The cost to the team involved in squeezing the software we needed into the limited confines even of a 1.68MB-formatted floppy, and in working with nonstandard floppy formats, was excessive.
In the interests of security MD5 hashes of the downloaded platform software were stored on the floppy. It was thus necessary to persuade all the test sites to create a new boot floppy before they could run a newly-released version of the platform software, for example to patch a vulnerability. This had its bright side, in that we were sure their configuration was consistent, but it was an operations nightmare and very slow.
Partly because of this inefficient upgrade path, the small number of security vulnerabilities discovered in our environment during the test consumed a totally disproportionate amount of the team's efforts, compounded by the way they tended to occur during holidays.
A second reason for the difficulty in responding to security vulnerabilities was the need to rebuild the distribution after patching it. LRP's build process was never very robust and our modifications were so extensive that build-ing became too fragile a process to manage under the time pressures involved in responding.
REQUIREMENTS
From this experience we developed requirements for the second version of the system:
• Use only generic PC hardware. • Install the operating system, application and all other software afresh in a newly-created evanescent filesystem on every boot.
• Even if it is compromised, there must be no place in the system to hide a Trojan horse.
• All software, including the daemon, must either run directly from read-only media or from packages whose signatures are verified by software running directly from read-only media before being installed into evanescent file systems. The public keys used to verify the signatures, and thus permitted to sign software, are stored on write-locked media.
• Each package may carry multiple signatures; a single revoked key cannot be a cause of system failure. The set of keys trusted to sign packages must be under the control of the appliance operator.
• Media containing system configuration data or keys must be write-locked while the network is up.
• Writability of media must be checked not assumed.
• No network-accessible daemons may run as root.
• The system must walk the user through the configuration process and test that the supplied values work before accepting them.
• Upgrading the system should require only a reboot.
• The response to a newly-discovered vulnerability should be simple and rapid, both to remove the vulnerability and repair any damage to a compromised appliance's state.
• The system must be easy for a small team to support: -Use a major OS distribution with security as its primary focus. -Don't change the OS build-from-source process.
-Maintain a minimal footprint in the OS source.
-The entire environment must build from scratch automatically every night.
BACKGROUND
These requirements led us to a design based on adapting the OpenBSD install [Insert a brief overview of the CD boot process and how the OpenBSD install-from-CD system is implemented, including the "crunched" binary and how it is created.] 6. DESIGN Our approach was to replace the /etc/rc script run by the minimal "boot floppy" environment on the install CD with a slightly augmented regular system's /etc/rc which:
• Establishes swap space. • Creates an evanescent file system in the swap space;
redirecting the system directories into it via symlinks.
• Validates the signatures on all necessary software packages.
• Installs the packages into the evanescent file system (via the symlinks).
• Installs the network configuration information from the floppy.
• Runs only the essential services: -The SSH daemon [13] for remote administration, with privilege separation [9] -The LOCKSS daemon inside the JVM run as an unprivileged user. -Do not run sendmail. Outbound mail is sent by ssmtp, a minimal SMTP client.
• Installs a crontab that checks at intervals for new packages and signatures to download. Download any found, cache them on the hard disk, and use them at the next reboot if their signatures are valid.
7. BUILD PROCESS Our build process starts by checking the patch branch out from OpenBSD's AnonCVS [3] service, updating our copy of the ports tree, then checking the implementation of the LOCKSS appliance platform out from our CVS server and copying it into place. The implementation resides entirely in a directory hierarchy below /usr/src/distrib/i386/lockss/ except for its kernel config file and an additional entry in /usr/src/distrib/i386/Makefile. The build process patches the kernel source to install one additional driver, for the swdt watchdog. Our goal of maintaining a small footprint in the distribution source has been met.
The build process is essentially the OpenBSD install CD build process. It results in a bootable CD very similar to OpenBSD's, but containing in addition to the basic OpenBSD packages a set of packages from the ports tree, including the JVM, the Red Hat emulator needed to run it, GnuPG, ssmtp and some libraries they depend on. It also contains a set of LOCKSS packages containing the daemon and its environment.
IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation consists almost entirely of three shell scripts, residing in the RAMdisk image in the CD's "boot floppy", executed during the system boot process. The work they do means that our appliance takes a rather long time to boot, but in the field of digital preservation speed is not a requirement. The scripts are: /etc/rc.0.lockss, which is executed very early in /etc/rc, before swap is enabled; /etc/rc.1.lockss, which is executed late in /etc/rc, just before /etc/rc.conf is executed and the system goes multi-user; /etc/lockss.start, which is executed at the end of /etc/rc.local.
The implementation also uses GnuPG [4] which (together with the libraries it needs) is accessed directly from a directory on the CD, to ensure that its testimony as to the trustworthiness of the packages to be installed can be trusted. The keys used in this process are on the writelocked floppy and are thus under the control of the appliance operator, who can add or delete keys.
The remaining part of the implementation consists of some additions to and deletions from the list of files to be "crunched" together to form the command binary in the minimal system in the CD's "boot floppy".
/etc/rc.0.lockss
This script is run just before swap is turned on to ensure that there is swap space available. It examines the available hard disks and, if they have not yet been partitioned appropriately, asks permission then does so.
The first hard disk is partitioned with about a gigabyte of swap space; the remainder and all other disks are used as file systems to contain preserved content. It creates an appropriate /etc/fstab describing them and the MFS [11] file system that will be created later in the swap space.
/etc/rc.1.lockss
This script implements the bulk of the LOCKSS "platform". We describe it in narrative form.
It attempts to mount the CD the system was booted from and, if it cannot, calls for help. It is not uncommon to find that the kernel autoconfiguration process has failed to recognize the CD from which it was booted.
It mounts the MFS file system on /dist then pauses for a few seconds. Using an MFS file system too soon after the daemon implementing it is started by the mount command causes problems.
At this point /tmp is in the RAMdisk and is about to run out of space. The script copies the content of /tmp to /dist/tmp and replaces /tmp with a symlink to /dist/tmp. It checks to see if there is a floppy in the drive. If not, it runs the configuration process described below. If there is one but it is write-enabled, the script refuses to proceed until it is write-locked. If there is a write-locked floppy, any configuration information it contains supercedes any configuration information on the CD. The GnuPG public keyring is initialized from the floppy.
Then it checks all the packages it can find on package path, which consists of the floppy, directories on the CD, and the cache of downloaded packages. Note that during this process, the entire running environment consists of the RAMdisk image from the CD and GnuPG, being run directly from the CD, and configuration data from a floppy that is known to be write-locked. The process is as follows:
• The network is bought up using the configuration information but without any daemons running.
• GnuPG is invoked to do a key revocation check on its keyring.
• The network is shut down. • All detached signatures for any MD5 files found in the package path are checked. If at least one valid signature by an unrevoked key is found, that file's list of MD5s is added to the valid-MD5 list.
• The package path is searched for versions of the packages to be installed. The MD5 of each version found is computed and compared against the valid-MD5 list. If a match is found, and a lower version number of the package is already in the installpackage script, it is deleted. Then a command to install this version is added to the script. The script next prepares for package installation by creating copies of the system directories under /dist and replacing the originals with symlinks pointing to the copies.
It then excutes the install-package script it wrote, installing the OpenBSD base "packages", a chosen set of packages from the ports tree, and a small number of LOCKSS packages. The packages come from one of the directories on the package path, but whichever one it is, the package is known to have had its MD5 signed by at least one unrevoked key.
Finally, the script unmounts everything it mounted and returns to the /etc/rc script.
/etc/lockss.start
This script is run by /etc/rc.local just before the end of the system boot process, after the system daemons we haven't disabled have been started. It enables the watchdog, checks for the required daemon configuration files then, if it finds them, invokes the JVM to run the LOCKSS daemon.
Configuration
LOCKSS peers use their IP address as an identity and thus, at present, do not support DHCP. If no configuration information is available, early in /etc/rc.1.lockss a text dialog is used to acquire an IP address, netmask, gateway, DNS servers, root password etc. The supplied values are validated by using them to bring up the network temporarily and perform some simple tests such as a DNS lookup. If the tests work, the configuration is written to the floppy as a text file. New SSH host keys are generated and stored on the floppy, as is the initial GnuPG public keyring.
EXPERIENCE
In general, the design, implementation and rollout of the new version to over 50 test sites went smoothly. Almost all our test sites have been trouble-free since their upgrade from the floppy version. This is a great tribute to the quality of OpenBSD. Nevertheless, we encountered a number of problems.
Our initial designs involved union mounting the MFS file system over the root directory. This didn't work.
There appears to be no way to check whether a floppy is write-locked or write-enabled without mounting it, and seeing whether an attempt to write to it fails. If it does fail, the kernel generates alarming error messages which the operator has to be told to ignore.
We orignally wanted to use the system itself to burn the CDs. Again, the operator has to ignore many alarming error messages, so we put the idea aside.
The kernel autoconfiguration sometimes fails to recognize the CD from which it was booted, causing the attempt to mount the CD to fail, and making the system unable to install the software on it.
The native 1.3 JVM for OpenBSD wasn't available, so we had to install the RedHat emulator and the RPM package, then run the Linux JVM under it. This works well but slows the boot and makes us nervous.
Despite our suggestion that they use second-hand machines, our enthusiastic test sites often buy brand-new hardware. This frequently has motherboard Ethernet chips which are too new for the OpenBSD drivers to use.
We have simulated our response to a security vulnerability and shown that building and distributing a patch is a far more efficient system than it was for the Linux floppy version. However, this simulation showed us that we need to improve our process for making a patch available, and focus on making our test sites aware that when we say "you need to reboot your system right now" they pay attention.
RELATED WORK
Our work has similarities with KNOPPIX [6] and other bootable Linux CDs used as demo and rescue systems.
They typically run directly from the CD rather than, as we do, installing system packages into an evanescent file system. We take a lot longer to boot while we do the installation, but we can validate the signatures on the packages, and thus use downloaded signed packages to upgrade the system on the CD.
We were also inspired in many ways by Sun's Cobalt product line [7] .
FUTURE WORK
Work on the platform is on hold for a while; while we focus on user it to deploy a completely re-written version of the daemon. When we get back to it, our to-do list includes revisiting the idea of union mounting MFS over the root, building a KNOPPIX-like LOCKSS demo mode, burning CDs from the system itself to allow packages and configuration data to the CD, using native Java, and releasing the appliance implementation via SourceForge.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, OpenBSD has proven an excellent basis for our network appliance. It is easy to adapt the install CD to our purposes. The carefully created default configuration is an excellent starting point for further restrictions. The use of privilege separation in the SSH daemon reduces the risk of allowing adminstrative access via the network. AnonCVS access to the patch branch and the ports tree has allowed us to build from scratch every night, materially reducing the load on a small support team, especially when responding to new vulnerabilities. The OpenBSD build process is well-structured and allowed us to add a new CD image with little effort, both initially and as the base distribution evolved from 3.1 to 3.2.
There are, however many deficiencies in OpenBSD that still need to be addressed if we, or others, are to deploy it successfully as an appliance. The most urgent for us are:
• The kernel produces large numbers of scary-looking error messages in non-error situations.
• The kernel does not reliably recognize low-cost IDE CD drives.
• The NIC drivers are sometimes unable to recognize or use leading-edge hardware.
